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WHAT CONSTITUTES A BENEFIT BY VIRTUE OF SECTION 186(2) OF THE 
LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 66 OF 1995? 
APOLLO TYRES SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD V CCMA 2013 5 BLLR 434 (LAC) 
E Fourie 
1 Introduction 
In the Apollo case1 the court once again had to determine the content of benefits in 
terms of section 186(2)(a) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereafter the LRA). 
Although the distinction between remuneration and benefits often seems unclear, it is 
an important distinction, as unfair conduct by an employer in relation to the provision 
of benefits may constitute an unfair labour practice in terms of section 186(2)(a). An 
unfair labour practice dispute can be resolved through conciliation and arbitration; 
however, disputes about remuneration are excluded from the jurisdiction of the CCMA. 
The court in this case firstly had to determine what constitutes a benefit as 
contemplated by section 186(2) of the LRA, and secondly had to determine if a benefit 
was limited to an entitlement which arises ex contractu or ex lege, or if it could also 
include a grant in terms of a policy or practice subject to the employer's discretion. 
2 The facts in the Apollo case 
The facts are summarised in the judgment of the Labour Appeal Court.2 
Hoosen, a 49-year-old female, was employed by Apollo Tyres South Africa (Pty) Ltd 
(the appellant) from 1 April 1984. Apollo Tyres, a tyre manufacturing company, 
struggling under economic pressures, introduced an early retirement scheme for 
certain employees. Through the introduction of this scheme the company tried to 
reduce the number of employees in accordance with the decrease in demand for its 
products. Employees were informed of this decision through various meetings and 
notices placed on the notice boards at the premises of the appellant. According to the 
said notice the scheme applied only to staff between the ages of 46 and 59 who were 
                                                          
  Elmarie Fourie. B.Proc ADL LLM (University of Johannesburg). Senior Lecturer, Department of 
Public Law, University of Johannesburg. E-mail: esfourie@uj.ac.za. 
1  Apollo Tyres South Africa (Pty) Limited v CCMA 2013 5 BLLR 434 (LAC) (hereafter the Apollo case). 
2  Apollo case paras 2-13. 
E FOURIE   PER / PELJ 2015(18)1 
 
3301 
 
paid on a monthly basis. The successful applicant would receive two months' additional 
pay and an ex gratia payment calculated on a sliding scale based on the age of the 
applicant. 
The third respondent (Hoosen) enquired about the scheme; however, she was refused 
entry into the scheme and was informed that to qualify for the early retirement scheme 
applicants had to be between 55 and 59. When asking for reasons she was sent from 
pillar to post. She enquired if she could appeal against the decision and mentioned 
that the phrase "subject to the management's discretion" could be abused, but was 
told by her immediate senior that his mind was made up and that she was to be 
replaced. Hoosen resigned and whilst serving notice she referred an unfair labour 
practice dispute to the CCMA. The argument raised at the CCMA was that the early 
retirement package was not a benefit in terms of section 182(2) and in any event that 
it was not unfair not to grant Hoosen the early retirement package. The commissioner 
found that it was unfair to deny Hoosen entry into the scheme. The court a quo found 
that the commissioner's ruling that the scheme was a benefit within the ambit of 
section 186(2)(a) of the LRA was a decision that fell within the band of 
reasonableness. According to the Labour Appeal Court the question before the court 
should not have been whether the commissioner reached a conclusion that a 
reasonable commissioner could not reach, but whether the second respondent was 
correct in his ruling that the CCMA did have jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. In 
other words, was his finding right or wrong?3 Leave to appeal was granted by the 
Labour Appeal Court. 
3 The judgment 
The issue that this court (the Labour Appeal Court) had to consider was formulated in 
the appellant's petition: 
The principal issue on which the Applicant seeks leave to appeal is whether the early 
retirement scheme initiated by the Applicant and for which Hoosen applied and was 
refused entry, constituted a benefit as contemplated in section 186(2) of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995.4 
                                                          
3 City of Cape Town v SAMWU obo Jacobs 2009 9 BLLR 882 (LAC). 
4  Apollo case para 18. 
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The court thus had to determine the meaning of benefits as provided for by section 
186(2)(a) of the LRA.5 In numerous cases courts in South Africa have endeavoured to 
give content to this concept left undefined by the legislature. 
In 1997 the Labour Court delivered judgment in Schoeman v Samsung Electronics SA 
(Pty) Ltd,6 concluding that commission is a part of remuneration. The court made 
reference to the definition of benefits as contained in the 6th edition (edited by JB 
Sykes) of the Concise Oxford Dictionary, as an advantage or an allowance to which a 
person is entitled under insurance or social security, or as a member of a benefit club 
or society. However, it is clear that this definition does not uniquely provide for 
benefits in terms of an employment contract.7 Considering that a wide interpretation 
of benefits may indirectly limit the right to strike, the court stated: 
Commission payable by the employer, forms part of the employee's salary. It is quid 
pro quo for services rendered, just as much as a salary or a wage. It is therefore part 
of the basic terms and conditions of employment. Remuneration is different from 
benefits. A benefit is something extra, apart from remuneration. Often it is a term 
and condition of an employment contract and often it is not. Remuneration is always 
a term and condition of the employment contract.8 
The judgment does not provide a definition of "something extra". Distinguishing 
employer arrangements for a pension, a provident fund or medical aid from 
remuneration provides an artificial distinction, as these contributions to different 
schemes are often agreed to because this is a tax-effective way of structuring an 
employment package.9 According to Revelas J, if the legislature wanted to include 
remuneration under the auspices of the residual unfair labour practice, it would have 
done so expressly.10 It is clear from the above that in the Schoeman judgment the 
court endeavoured to distinguish between the concepts of remuneration and benefits 
                                                          
5  S 186(2)(a) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereafter the LRA) states: "Unfair labour 
practice means any unfair act or omission that arises between an employer and employee 
involving- (a) unfair conduct by the employer relating to the promotion, demotion, probation 
(excluding disputes about dismissals for a reason relating to probation) or training of an employee 
or relating to the provisions of benefits to an employee". 
6 Schoeman v Samsung Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd 1997 10 BLLR 1346 (LC). 
7 Schoeman v Samsung Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd 1997 10 BLLR 1346 (LC) 1368. The employee in 
this case did not claim a new right, but was trying to hold on to an existing entitlement, namely 
her commission, and was seeking to enforce the terms of her contract. 
8  Schoeman v Samsung Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd 1997 10 BLLR 1346 (LC) 1368G. 
9 Le Roux 1997 CLL 97. 
10 Schoeman v Samsung Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd 1997 10 BLLR 1346 (LC) 1368. 
E FOURIE   PER / PELJ 2015(18)1 
 
3303 
 
and, as subsequently illustrated by numerous other decisions, this was not an easy 
task. Given the wide definition of remuneration in section 213, it was clear that the 
court would experience difficulties in finding what something extra or apart from 
remuneration was.11 In this case, a strict approach was adopted as to the scope of 
item 2(1)(b) of the residual unfair labour practice. 
In Northern Cape Provincial Administration v Commissioner Hambridge12 the court 
upheld the narrow definition of benefits and categorised remuneration as essentialia 
of a contract of employment and that other rights or advantages or benefits accruing 
to an employee by agreement are termed naturalia.13 Landman J then stated that the 
word benefit as provided in item 2(1)(b) means at least a non-wage benefit, hereby 
concurring with Revelas J in the Samsung case.14 This decision by the Labour Court 
has been criticised, as the distinction between benefits and remuneration seems 
artificial, as there is often an overlap between benefits and remuneration.15 
On appeal, Mogoeng AJA stated that the legislature did not intend to facilitate the 
creation of new benefits through item 2(1)(b), but to provide for disputes about 
benefits to which an employee is entitled ex contractu or ex lege.16 The court somehow 
lost touch with the purpose of the unfair labour practice concept, namely to provide 
employees with a remedy where the employee does not have a contractual remedy.17 
The court once again highlighted that disputes of interest should be dealt with through 
the collective bargaining process. 
                                                          
11 S 213 of the LRA defines remuneration as "any payment of money or in kind, or both in money 
and kind, made or owing to any person in return for that person working for any other person, 
including the State, and that remunerate has a corresponding meaning". 
12 Northern Cape Provincial Administration v Commissioner Hambridge 1999 20 ILJ 1910 (LC). 
13 Northern Cape Provincial Administration v Commissioner Hambridge 1999 20 ILJ 1910 (LC) paras 
13F-G, 13G-H. The court found some support for the distinction in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 
where the term "fringe benefit" is defined as "a perquisite or benefit paid by an employer to 
supplement a money wage or salary". In para 14H, the court also referred to the 1988 ILO Wages 
– A Worker's Education Manual, where it states that a fringe benefit is a supplement for which no 
work is done. 
14  Northern Cape Provincial Administration v Commissioner Hambridge 1999 20 ILJ 1910 (LC) para 
14I. 
15  Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 561. 
16 It must be pointed out that the term ex lege was used by Moegoeng AJA with reference to the 
Public Service Act 103 of 1994, as the relevant statutory provision was examined in an attempt to 
determine what the obligations of the public servant are. On appeal the case was reported as 
HOSPERSA v Northern Cape Provincial Administration 2000 21 ILJ 1066 (LAC) para 9.  
17 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 559. 
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In Gaylard v Telkom SA Ltd18 the court emphasized that too wide an interpretation of 
the term "benefit" so as to include even wages was not the legislature's intention, as 
it would undermine the rights to strike and lock-out. In Sithole v Nogwaza19 the court 
referred to a common thread running through all the decisions, namely that a benefit 
constitutes a material benefit and the benefit must have some monetary value to the 
recipient and cost to the employer. These judgments confirm the underlying policy 
considerations by the courts to keep the distinction between disputes over rights and 
disputes of interest separate.20 
In the Apollo case the Labour Appeal Court criticized the distinction between salaries 
and remuneration drawn by the courts and described it as artificial and unsustainable. 
According to the court the definition in section 213 of the Act is wide enough to 
encompass wages, salaries, and most if not all extras or benefits.21 Today many 
benefits are payment in kind and form part of the essentialia of employment 
contracts.22 
The court supported the statement in Protekon (Pty) Ltd v CCMA23 that the concern 
that a wide definition of benefit might curtail the right to strike is no longer valid. The 
judge remarked that there is no closed list of benefits that fall within the ambit of the 
statutory provision and that there can be little doubt that most pension, medical aid 
and similar schemes fall within the scope, despite the fact that employer contributions 
to these schemes are covered by the definition of remuneration.24 This remark by 
                                                          
18 Gaylard v Telkom SA Ltd 1998 19 ILJ 1624 (LC) para 22. The court excluded wages and salaries, 
as well as accumulated leave from the concept. 
19 Sithole v Nogwaza 1999 20 ILJ 2710 (LC). 
20  A wide definition could undermine the constitutionally entrenched right to strike in s 23. In paras 
52A-B the court referred to interpretation provided by PAK Le Roux in a conference paper: Rights 
disputes are normally seen as disputes concerning the existence, content and extent of legal rights 
and the interpretation of a legal rule. Disputes of interest, on the other hand, are generally 
regarded as being concerned with the creation of new rights rather than the interpretation and 
application of existing rights. See Le Roux "Criteria in Interest Arbitrations". 
21  Apollo case para 26. 
22  The court referred to Le Roux's discussion of the Samsung case, where he highlights that pension, 
provident, medical aid, group life and disability schemes are often important issues during the 
negotiation of an employment contract, and contributions to these schemes are often agreed to 
on the basis of a "salary sacrifice", because it is beneficial for tax purposes. Apollo case para 26. 
Also see Le Roux 1997 CLL 97. 
23 Protekon (Pty) Ltd v CCMA 2005 7 BLLR 703 (LC). The employer in the Protekon case agreed that 
the travel concession did constitute a benefit in terms of s 186(2)(a). 
24  Protekon (Pty) Ltd v CCMA 2005 7 BLLR 703 (LC) para 20. 
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Todd AJ, although obiter, seems to be more realistic and in line with Le Roux's notions 
stated above. In the Protekon case, with reference to the HOSPERSA25 case, the judge 
confirmed that the unfair labour practice jurisdiction cannot be used to assert an 
entitlement to new benefits or to new forms of remuneration or new policies, as this 
should be left to the collective bargaining process.26 
Although the Labour Appeal Court found that this might be true, it seems to have 
found the above statement contrary to what was held in the Maritime Industries case. 
This case does make reference to the hybrid nature of some disputes, and Zondo JP 
stated that: 
However, if a dispute about a unilateral change of conditions of employment can 
properly fall within the provisions of item 2(1)(b) of Schedule 7, it will nevertheless 
be arbitrable. "Strikeable" and arbitrable disputes do not necessarily divide into 
watertight compartments. Although in relation to dispute resolution the Act 
contemplates the separation of disputes into those that are resolved through 
arbitration, those that are resolved through adjudication and those that are resolved 
through power-play, there are disputes in respect of which the Act provides a choice 
between power-play on the one hand and arbitration on the other as a means of their 
resolution.27 
Although the Act provides employees with a choice in certain instances, where, for 
example, a rights dispute may also give rise to a lawful strike, this does not mean that 
employees involved in strike action can resort to arbitration or adjudication at the 
same time over the same dispute.28 
The arguments before this court were that an employee may not utilise the provisions 
of section 186(2)(a) to create a new right and that section 186(2)(a) intended to give 
employees recourse only in the case of unfair conduct in terms of an existing right. It 
was submitted that the purpose of section 186(2)(a) was to assist employees such as 
Hoosen who have no other remedy in legislation or the common law. This notion 
                                                          
25  HOSPERSA v Northern Cape Provincial Administration 2000 21 ILJ 1066 (LAC). 
26 Protekon (Pty) Ltd v CCMA 2005 7 BLLR 703 (LC) para 22. 
27 Maritime Industries Trade Union of SA v Transnet Ltd 2002 23 ILJ 2213 (LC) para 106. 
28 Le Roux 2006 ILJ 62. See s 65(2)(a) of the LRA in terms of matters dealt with in ss 12-15 and s 
189A of the LRA, which affords employees the election to resort to industrial action on the 
substantive basis of the dismissal or referral to the Labour Court. 
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supports the purpose and effect of the residual unfair labour practice jurisdiction and 
is in contrast to the findings in HOSPERSA.29 
In the Apollo judgment, Musi AJA supported the statement in Protekon that the mere 
existence of a discretion exercised by an employer does not deprive the CCMA of 
jurisdiction. In line with the Protekon judgment the court highlighted two instances 
where the CCMA would have jurisdiction to consider the fairness of the employer's 
conduct, namely where the employer fails to comply with a contractual obligation that 
it has towards the employee and where the employer exercises a discretion that it 
enjoys in terms of a contract of the scheme conferring the benefits.30 According to the 
Apollo case the second instance will include matters where the employer enjoys a 
discretion in terms of a policy or practice relating to the provisions of benefits, as the 
court in Protekon used the words “contractual terms” loosely, and in the context of 
that judgment this meant when the employer exercises a discretion under the terms 
of the scheme. 
In this case the contract did not provide for early retirement benefits and according 
to the HOSPERSA judgment, the acceleration of the benefits (early retirement) 
diminished its value as a benefit, as Hoosen (the respondent) had no contractual right 
to the accelerated retirement benefits. The HOSPERSA premise that a benefit must be 
ex contractu or ex lege leaves the employee in this case without a remedy, and the 
implications are that an employee who refers an unfair labour practice relating to 
training or promotion does not have to show that he or she has a right to promotion 
or training in order to qualify for a remedy. However, when an employee wants to use 
the same remedy in relation to benefits, he or she now has to show a right or 
entitlement ex contractu or ex lege. Being the only employee affected, Hoosen would 
also be denied the right to strike. The court then stated: 
                                                          
29  HOSPERSA v Northern Cape Provincial Administration 2000 21 ILJ 1066 (LAC) paras 52A-B. The 
court referred to interpretation provided by PAK Le Roux in a conference paper: Rights disputes 
are normally seen as disputes concerning the existence, content and extent of legal rights and the 
interpretation of a legal rule. Disputes of interest, on the other hand, are generally regarded as 
being concerned with the creation of new rights rather than the interpretation and application of 
existing rights. See Le Roux "Criteria in Interest Arbitrations" and HOSPERSA v Northern Cape 
Provincial Administration 2000 21 ILJ 1066 (LAC) para 9. 
30  Apollo case para 46. 
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Clearly the notion that the benefit must be based on an ex contractu or ex lege 
entitlement in a case like this would render the unfair labour practice jurisdiction 
sterile.31 
After an evaluation of the various attempts by our courts to provide a definition, the 
Labour Appeal Court stated: 
… a benefit in terms of section 186(2)(a) can be defined to include a right or 
entitlement to which the employee is entitled, ex contractu or ex lege, including rights 
judicially created as well as an advantage or privilege offered or granted to an 
employee in terms of a practice or policy subject to the employer's discretion.32 
The court found that the early retirement scheme was a benefit, and that by not 
granting it to Hoosen the employer committed an unfair labour practice. Hoosen did 
not have a contractual entitlement to the early retirement benefits and the granting 
of this benefit was subject to the employer's discretion. This definition means that the 
judgments in HOSPERSA, GS4 Security and Scheepers are incorrect. The only other 
issue that must then be considered is if the discretion was exercised unfairly. Only two 
qualifying criteria for the early retirement benefits were conveyed to the employees, 
namely age and being an employee paid on a monthly basis. It was only later on that 
the disqualifying age factor (between 55 years and 59 years old) was added, and that 
in order to qualify if aged below 55 the employee must suffer from ill-health. The 
employer kept on changing the criteria and it is evident that there was no fair, 
acceptable or rational reason to deny the respondent participation in the scheme. The 
employer was not exercising his discretion fairly. It was decided that the employer in 
this case had committed an unfair labour practice relating to the provision of benefits 
in terms of section 186(2)(a). 
4 Evaluation 
Clear guidelines had been developed with regard to promotion, demotion and 
probationary status by our courts and arbitrators, so why was it so difficult to give 
content to the provision of benefits? The term "benefits" is not defined in this Act or 
any other legislation, and the South African courts were tasked with defining and 
clarifying this concept – something that turned out to be an onerous task. It seems 
                                                          
31 Apollo case para 48. 
32      Apollo case para 50. 
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that in their endeavours not to unduly limit the right to strike, the courts somehow 
neglected the original aim of categorizing some labour practices as unfair, namely to 
protect employees who are without a remedy. The courts insisted that a benefit is 
something arising out of a contract or law; however, in these instances employees 
would have recourse to the ordinary courts. The narrow interpretation of the term 
"benefits" by South African courts can perhaps be ascribed to the courts' quest to 
uphold the distinction between disputes of right and disputes of interest, and therefore 
in their attempt to separate benefits form remuneration they created a very artificial 
divide.33 The courts therefore upheld the restrictive interpretation of benefits to uphold 
the divide between disputes of interest and disputes of rights and to ensure that issues 
that should be the subject of negotiation could not become issues that can be decided 
by an arbitrator.34 
In the Apollo case the Labour Appeal Court declined to follow three earlier Labour 
Appeal Court judgments, namely, HOSPERSA v Northern Cape Administration,35 
Gauteng Provinsiale Administrasie v Scheepers36 and the unreported judgment of G4S 
Security Services (SA) (Pty) Ltd v NASGAWU.37 
The judgment in Protekon represented a wider interpretation of the concept of 
benefits and a focus on employer conduct. According to this case the purpose of the 
unfair labour practice provision with reference to benefits is to scrutinize employer 
conduct where the employer exercises discretion in relation to the provisions of 
benefits, and to regulate these discretionary powers. In the Protekon case the court 
divided the provisions of benefits into two categories, namely an issue in dispute 
regarding a demand by employees that certain benefits be granted or reinstated 
                                                          
33  A dispute of right refers to an infringement, application or interpretation of existing rights 
embodied in a contract of employment, collective agreement or legislation, while a dispute of 
interest refers to the creation of a new right. 
34  S 191(5) of the LRA provides that disputes in respect of unfair labour practices must be referred 
to arbitration and s 65(1)(c) prohibits strikes or lock-outs when an issue can be referred to 
arbitration. Since unfair labour practices are disputes about rights and not disputes of interest, a 
dispute over benefits must be classified as a dispute of rights to fall within the scope of the 
protection offered by the unfair labour practice regime. 
35 HOSPERSA v Northern Cape Provincial Administration 2000 21 ILJ 1066 (LAC). 
36 Gauteng Provinsiale Administrasie v Scheepers 2000 7 BLLR 756 (LAC). 
37 G4S Security Services (SA) (Pty) Ltd v NASGAWU unreported case number DA3/08 of 26 November 
2009. 
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without consideration of the fairness of the employer's conduct, and, secondly, where 
the issue in dispute concerns the fairness of the employer's conduct.38 As no party has 
a right to refer the first issue to arbitration, there seems to be no restriction to 
industrial action; however, when a dispute concerns the fairness of the employer's 
conduct it is clearly justiciable. It is important that the court considers the substance 
of the dispute and not the form in which it is presented. This will require an assessment 
of the facts pertaining to each case and determining the true nature of the dispute. 
The fact that granting a benefit might be discretionary does not oust the CCMA of 
jurisdiction. 
What becomes clear from the Apollo case is that the unfair labour practice jurisdiction 
cannot be used to assert an entitlement to new benefits, new forms of remuneration 
or new policies, and this finding appears to be correct. Under the unfair labour practice 
regime the conduct of the employer may be scrutinised by the CCMA in at least two 
instances, namely when an employer fails to comply with a contractual obligation, an 
entitlement or right that an employee may have in terms of a statute, and secondly 
when an employer exercises a discretion under the contractual terms of a scheme 
conferring a benefit, including situations where the employer enjoys a discretion in 
terms of benefits provided in terms of a policy or practice – rights created judicially. 
This decision places the emphasis on the employer's actions and the unfairness of 
such acts or omissions.39 
After a court has established that the issue falls under the ambit of section 186(2)(a) 
and involves the discretion of the employer, it must then consider if the discretion was 
exercised unfairly. In determining the issue of unfairness the court referred to the 2nd 
edition of Du Toit et al, though the 5th edition, known as Labour Relations: A 
Comprehensive Guide (2006), referred to the concept at page 486, and stated that 
unfairness implies a failure to meet an objective standard and may be taken to include 
arbitrary, capricious or inconsistent conduct, whether through neglect or intended. 
The court found that the employee qualified to participate and was unfairly disallowed 
                                                          
38  Protekon (Pty) Ltd v CCMA 2005 7 BLLR 703 (LC). 
39 Also see IMATU obo Verster v Umhlathuse Muncipality 2011 9 BLLR 882 (LC). 
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to do so as the employer did not exercise its discretion fairly and continued to shift 
the goal posts. 
It is clear from the judgment that a dispute that arises ex contractu or ex lege can fall 
within the scope of section 186(2)(a); however, the court found the HOSPERSA 
approach untenable – ie that the benefit must be an entitlement rooted in a contract 
or legislation. As such, an employee will be able to refer a contractual dispute to 
arbitration or to the Labour Court on the basis of its being a contractual claim. The 
arbitration option will avoid the expense of litigating in the Labour Court and will 
certainly be the more speedy option. However, as indicated by Le Roux, the cost of 
litigating in the CCMA may be underestimated when dealing with a vague and often 
subjective concept of fairness and the uncertainty surrounding the law relating to 
benefits. He also indicates that the employer will now be able to raise not only 
contractual defences but also broader fairness defences during arbitration.40 
The court's approach that discretionary decisions by the employer should be covered 
by section 186(2)(a) must be applauded, as employees previously left without a 
contractual remedy can now be covered. This means that the unfair labour practice 
provision in terms of benefits was designed for cases where the employee has no 
remedy in contract or common law. However, the judgment does not clarify what 
exactly can be understood by judicially created rights or what constitutes a policy or 
a practice and we are once again left with concepts that are not given clear content. 
Although Cheadle argued in 2006 that the inclusion of unfair conduct relating to 
benefits appears not to have any independent reason for inclusion, the Apollo decision 
illustrates one of the reasons for inclusion, as employees affected by a discretionary 
decision are now provided with a remedy.41 
An employee bringing a claim under section 186(2) of the LRA merely needs to show 
that a disputed payment or practice exists in the workplace and that the entitlement 
is rooted in a contract, legislation, judicial ruling, discretionary advantage or privilege 
and was unfairly denied to him. It is clear from this judgment that the employee 
                                                          
40 Le Roux 2013 CLL 79. 
41  Cheadle 2006 ILJ 663. 
E FOURIE   PER / PELJ 2015(18)1 
 
3311 
 
cannot use the provisions in section 186(2) to create new rights. Claims brought under 
the auspices of section 186(2) will be decided on the specific facts and the conduct of 
the employer will be the focus. The employer can endeavor to show fair reasons for 
not providing the benefit. 
The uncertainty surrounding the concept benefit was created not by the courts but 
rather by the legislature, as it is not defined and clearly has a wide ambit. Cheadle's42 
argument in 2006 that the time had come to abandon the concept now seems futile; 
however, dare we hope for a new, precise definition from the legislature? This 
judgment also illustrates the concluding remarks by Adolph Landman that unfair 
labour practice has crept into the heart of our labour law jurisprudence, and, as he 
predicted then, it will continue to grow, by conventional and unconventional means, 
as long as lawful, unilateral action is regarded by the courts in their capacity as 
custodians of industrial justice as being unfair and inequitable.43 
  
                                                          
42  Cheadle 2006 ILJ 663. 
43 Landman 2004 ILJ 812. 
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